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ABSTRACT 
Three types of justification of the market feature in liberal-egalitarian and in left-libertarian 
conceptions of justice. One is present in Rawls’s conception, another in Dworkin’s. and a third 
one in Steiner’s, jointly with one he shares with Dworkin. I shall briefly substantiate these 
exegetical claims and indicate how they shed light on the convergence between Steiner’s left 
libertarianism and my own brand of liberal egalitarianism, against both Rawls and Dworkin, on 




The market mechanism consists of a number of buyers and a number of sellers interacting 
with one another in such a way that goods and services get exchanged at some price. It is 
endorsed, as a matter of justice, by all libertarians, including left libertarians such as Hillel 
Steiner. It also seems to be condoned by all liberal-egalitarian conceptions of justice, i.e. all 
conceptions that try to combine a commitment to equal respect for the diverse conceptions of the 
good life to be found in a pluralistic society and a commitment to substantive equality in 
whatever makes our lives better lives. Why? The answers turn out to vary and, for a subset of 
them only, to overlap with one of two answers to be found in left. libertarianism. 
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1. RAWLS  
Take first Rawls’s theory. It interprets substantive equality in a lax, efficiency-sensitive 
way, in the sense that it allows some to have more than others because narrowing the gap would 
involve an unreasonable cost The difference principle interprets this “unreasonable cost” as a 
worsening of the situation of the worst off. If making the expectations associated with the various 
social positions less unequal would result in making the worst social position even worse — 
whether or not it would be occupied by the same people —, then more equality would come at an 
unreasonable cost, and the fact that the less fortunate have less valuable opportunities than the 
more fortunate is justified by the difference principle. Does this entail an endorsement of the 
market?  
It does on the empirical assumption that the use of markets is so efficient, as regards both 
the allocation and generation of resources, that the index of social and economic advantages 
sustainably associated with the worst social position under the best feasible market arrangement 
is higher than under any arrangement that makes no use of the market. This is a purely 
instrumental, contingent  and highly conditional endorsement of the market economy. It is 
logically consistent with the possibility that countless market-based economic arrangements are 
less just than countless non-market-based arrangements. Moreover, the best market-based 
arrangement — some version of Rawls’s “property-owning democracy” — is bound to involve a 
tight regulation of the market, e.g. by tax, environmental and labour law, and possibly a partial or 
total insulation of some sectors of activity — security, education, health care, banking, media ? 
— from the grip of the market. 
Is there no deeper Rawlsian justification for the market? One suggestion that there may be 
such a justification rests on the role the difference principle gives to income and wealth. What 
could income and wealth mean in the absence of markets on which to use them? This second 
connection is real, but weak. Along with the other social and economic advantages that feature in 
the index used by the difference principle — powers and prerogatives, and leisure time —, 
income and wealth have been picked because they are primary goods, i.e., in Rawls’s initial 
definition, "things that every rational man is presumed to want" (1971: 62, 92) and, in his later 
definition, "what persons need in their status as free and equal citizens, and as normal and fully 
cooperating members of society over a complete life". (TJ2, xiii). Given the role income and 
wealth are thereby given, nothing forces us to interpret them as purchasing power on a market. 
Instead of being accessible as commodities, the goods we need as rational people or as free and 
equal citizens could conceivably be made available by some public agency, and still be 
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incorporated into the index that aggregates the lifetime advantages associated with each social 
position. Working out such an index is no doubt greatly facilitated if income and wealth can be 
expressed as purchasing power, but no conceptual relationship to the market is presupposed. 
A third connection between Rawls’s conception and the market mechanism is suggested by 
his a priori rejection of central planning as a just social regime, in sharp contrast with the 
sympathy he expresses for “liberal socialism”, along with the form of capitalism he calls 
“property-owning democracy”. Central planning and liberal socialism have in common that the 
means of production are publicly owned, and hence out of market reach. The key difference is 
that liberal socialism relies on a labour market, whereas central planning has to use public 
authority to allocate labour, and thereby violates the workers’ freedom of occupational choice. 
Can it not be said, in this light, that the liberty constraint, rather than sensitivity to efficiency 
considerations, turns reliance on the market, at any rate for labour services, into a necessary 
feature of a just Rawlsian society? Not quite.  
For it is possible to imagine a socialist society which neither curtails the workers’ freedom 
of occupational choice nor steers their choices through the use of differentiated market wage 
rates. But it would simply be so inefficient that it is unlikely to be sustainable, let alone to beat 
liberal socialism or property-owning democracy by the standards of the difference principle. In 
other words, the absence of a labour market does not entail a violation of the liberty constraint but 
creates a dilemma between such a violation and making the worst off dramatically worse off. 
Consequently, this further suggestion of a deeper link between Rawlsian justice and the market 
fails just as much as the previous one. Whether and when the market is justified from a Rawlsian 
perspective is a contingent instrumental matter fully captured by the efficiency-sensitivity of the 
difference principle. The same cannot be said of Dworkin’s theory of distributive justice, to 
which we now turn. 
 
2. DWORKIN  
Dworkin’s theory of distributive justice is motivated by dissatisfaction with Rawls’s theory 
on the ground that it is not egalitarian enough, not efficiency-sensitive enough, and not 
responsibility-sensitive enough. Rawls is not egalitarian enough, according to Dworkin (1981: 
339), because his theory of distributive justice pays inappropriately little attention to the plight of 
the handicapped: some are simply excluded from consideration because they fall outside what 
Rawls calls the “normal range”, and even the others are granted no specific compensation on 
4 
grounds of their handicap. At the same time, Rawls is not efficiency-sensitive enough, Dworkin 
claims, because gains, however small, for the worst off justify losses, however big, for everyone 
else (1981: 339-40). Thirdly, and most importantly in Dworkin’s eyes, Rawls’s theory is not 
responsibility-sensitive enough: it fails to pay appropriate attention to ambition (1981: 343-4). 
One might try to address each of these putative defects separately. What Dworkin proposes is an 
alternative theory of distributive justice that gets rid of all three in one sweep. 
The core of his approach is captured by the conjunction of two “twin principles” (2000: 
324, 340) which he now also refers to as the two “dimensions of dignity” (2006: 98, 103-4): 
“equal concern”, or the idea that it is equally important to the political community that each 
person’s life should go well, and “personal responsibility”, or the idea that the fate of each person 
should be sensitive to their own choices. From these principles it follows that distributive justice 
consists in making people’s share of resources “sensitive to their choices but insensitive to their 
circumstances” (2000: 322-23). To give these abstract demands a more precise expression, 
Dworkin uses two devices — a competitive auction and a hypothetical insurance scheme — 
which are meant to specify how the just distribution can remain ambition-sensitive while being 
made endowment-insensitive in the space of impersonal and personal resources, respectively. Or 
at least so it seems. 
The first device requires us to imagine a situation in which a number of shipwrecked 
people arrive on a desert island. An auctioneer is put in charge of selling all the goods found on 
the island, each divided as finely as makes any sense. Each shipwreck survivor is endowed with 
an equal number of clamshells and instructed to use all of them, and nothing else, to bid publicly 
for these goods on the basis of all relevant information. The auction stops and the goods are 
distributed between the shipwrecked when each clamshell is committed and each good assigned 
to the highest bidder. The resulting allocation has three important properties. Firstly, it is Pareto-
optimal: no reallocation of the goods can make someone better off without making someone else 
worse off. Secondly, it is envy-free: no one prefers anyone else’s bundle of goods to her own. 
Thirdly and most importantly, the bundle allocated to each person can plausibly be interpreted as 
having the same value as the bundle allocated to any other, in the sense that its opportunity cost to 
others is the same. What the auction proposes is “that the true measure of the social resources 
devoted to the life of one person is fixed by asking how important that resource is for others” 
(1981: 288). 
By thus making the amount of goods each receives responsive to how valuable they are to 
others, the auction can be said to make the distribution of the island’s goods ambition-sensitive. 
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By giving each of the shipwrecked an equal number of clamshells, it can also be said to make the 
distribution endowment-insensitive. Or at least it could be if only impersonal resources mattered. 
But what people will be able to achieve with the goods they are allocated will also depend on 
their personal resources, their talents. Dworkin’s most impressive achievement consists in 
offering a solution for this problem. The key idea is that the availability of insurance turns brute 
luck — which endowment-sensitivity requires us to neutralize — into option luck — the 
consequences of which ambition-sensitivity requires each of us to bear. Brute luck is unchosen, 
whereas option luck is the outcome of a voluntary gamble. Those who take such a gamble and 
lose have no claim against those who win. And those who choose to abstain are owed nothing by 
those who gamble and win, nor owe anything to those who gamble and lose (see 1981: 292-5).  
In the first-best version of his hypothetical insurance scheme, Dworkin asks us to imagine 
that we each know the distribution of all talents and handicaps among the members of our society 
as well as our own preferences, including our risk aversion, and to specify how much we would 
insure under such circumstances for each possible risk if the probability of having any particular 
talent or handicap were the same for everyone, bearing in mind that the premiums to be paid if 
lucky will have to cover the indemnities to be received if unlucky, each weighted by the 
probabilities of the situations that trigger them (1981: 276-7). If it could be performed, this 
ingenious exercise would yield a set of person-specific vectors of lump-sum taxes and transfers, 
each corresponding to a possible endowment in personal resources of the person concerned. 
However, it involves a frightening amount of intellectual gymnastics, and moreover requires 
information that is unavoidably unavailable and, even it were available to some people, could not 
be expected to be truthfully revealed.  
A first problem stems from the causal relationship between endowments and preferences. 
Can we make any sense of a thought experiment that requires us to abstract from our endowments 
while retaining preferences which we would not have had, had it not been for these endowments? 
Secondly, there is an unavoidable trade off between the specifiability of desirability and the 
specifiability of probability. For us to be able to determine how attractive or unattractive we 
would find a particular endowment of personal resources, the nomenclature of endowments needs 
to be pretty fine-grained. But the more fine-grained, the more difficult it is to assign probabilities 
to them. Thirdly, there is a formidable moral hazard problem. Even supposing people were able to 
determine the desirability, given their preferences, of all possible endowments, how can one 
expect them to honestly reveal these preferences? Is it not precisely against the absence of the 
talents they actually lack that they would say they would have insured?   
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Dworkin is aware of these difficulties and therefore falls back on “what level of insurance 
of different kinds we can safely assume that most reasonable people would have bought if the 
wealth of the community had been equally divided and if, though everyone knew the overall odds 
of different forms of bad luck, no one had any reason to think that he himself had already had that 
bad luck or had better or worse odds of suffering it than anyone else” (2006: 115-116). The 
resulting rough approximation, Dworkin conjectures, will be a tax-funded scheme covering a 
number of specific risks. What sort of taxation? A progressive income tax rather than 
differentiated lump sum taxes on endowments, because of the difficulty of identifying and 
assessing the value of a person’s talents (see 1981: 325-326, 2002:126-9). Which specific risks? 
Mainly “ordinary handicaps”, such as blindness or deafness, with a level of premium and 
indemnity fixed by the average person (1981: 277-279), and the lack of sufficient skills to earn 
some minimum level of income no lower than the community’s poverty line (2000: 335-8). 
 This is what Dworkin’s hypothetical insurance scheme leads to as a rough practical 
approximation. But the insurance scheme, as understood so far, is meant to make the just 
distribution endowment-sensitive only as regards personal resources. As regards impersonal 
resources, it seems that it is the auction that should guide us. If this is right, the equal distribution 
of clamshells among shipwreck survivors suggests that Dworkin should favour a 100% tax on all 
gifts and bequests. However, he resists this implication, on the ground that it would amount to 
severely restricting the use people could make of their possessions: they could freely consume 
what they have but would be banned from giving it to others. In his original article, Dworkin 
cautiously left aside “the troublesome issue of bequest” (1981: 334-5). When returning to the 
issue much later, he made a very different proposal. It is not the auction but a second, distinct 
hypothetical insurance scheme that should guide our effort to achieve insensitivity to impersonal 
endowments: “we can imagine guardians contracting for insurance against their charges’ having 
the bad luck to be born to parents who can give or will leave them relatively little.” (2000: 347-8). 
This modification is subsequently corrected, when Dworkin proposes “a different (and now I 
think better) description of gift and inheritance tax as insurance premium. On this different 
account, such taxes fall not on the donor, as my discussion assumed, but on the recipient of the 
gift or bequest.” (2004: 353). 
 The upshot of this revision is that endowment-sensitivity is now achieved through a 
single hypothetical insurance scheme, with gift and inheritance lumped together with talents and 
handicaps among the dimensions of good and bad brute luck, to be transformed into option luck 
by the insurance scheme. In the first-best version of this scheme, we are asked to imagine all 
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possible combinations of personal and impersonal endowments with their associated probabilities 
and to work out how high a premium we would be willing to pay or how high an indemnity we 
would want to receive in each of these possible situations, on the assumption that we have the 
same probability as anyone else to be in each of them, and under the constraint that the premiums 
must probabilistically cover the indemnities.  
Does this mean that the auction has no role left to play? Not at all. The auction is still 
there. But instead of arriving on the island with nothing that distinguishes them from one another, 
the settlers are now supposed to land each with a bundle of personal and impersonal resources, 
i.e. the endowments they owe to genetics and upbringing, to gifts and bequests. In this less 
simplified scenario, equality demands that the clamshells should be distributed not in equal 
amounts, but in the way determined by the hypothetical insurance. Those who, in their own 
judgement, regard themselves lucky will owe some amount of clamshells in tax. Those who 
regard themselves unlucky will be owed some amount of clamshells in subsidy.  
The point of the auction parable is then simply to indicate what amount of goods it is fair 
that these clamshells should command, bearing in mind that the auction should now also concern 
the goods produced and the services offered by the settlers. The general equilibrium price 
structure that the auction is meant to elicit will determine how much each will be able to consume 
of the goods she desires, not only in the light of how scarce the initial supply of these goods is 
and of how widely and intensely the taste for them is shared, but also in the light of how much the 
labour each supplies will be valued by the auction, given the type and amount of labour others are 
able and willing to supply. If among two goods you could consume one uses less valuable 
resources than another (given how scarce they are and how many people want goods produced 
out of them), it is fair — not merely efficient — that you should have less of the latter than of the 
former. If among two jobs you could do, one produces more valuable resources than another 
(given the direct and indirect demand for them), it is fair — not only efficient — that you should 
be paid less for doing the latter than for doing the former. 
 The role of the auction parable, in other words, is not to indicate how a just distribution 
must be made insensitive to impersonal endowments. It is rather to express the central role 
assigned to the market in the specification of the metric of justice. From his earliest formulation, 
Dworkin states boldly that the idea of a market must be at centre of any attractive conception of 
equality of resources (1981: 284). Most explicitly: “On my view a market in goods and services is 
indispensable to justice because only a market can measure what one person has taken for himself 
by identifying the opportunity cost to others of his having it, so only a market can allow people 
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who enjoy a fair distribution of resources to preserve that fairness through their later decisions of 
occupation, investment, and consumption.” (Dworkin 2004: 342). Both consumption and 
production choices are unequally expensive to society and a responsibility-sensitive conception of 
justice must take this into account: “An efficient market for investment, labor and goods works as 
a kind of auction in which the cost to someone of what he consumes, by way of goods and 
leisure, and the value of what he adds, through his productive labor or decisions, is fixed by the 
amount his use of some resource costs others, or his contributions benefit them, in each case 
measured by their willingness to pay for it.” (Dworkin 1983: 207). 
For this reason, Dworkin, unlike Rawls, objects to socialism as a matter of principle, not 
only as a matter of empirical contingency. Whereas his principle of equal concern is perfectly 
compatible with a centrally planned economy, his principle of personal responsibility is not: “A 
socialist society, for example, might assign jobs, fix wages and provide housing, health care, and 
other benefits in such a way that everyone has a roughly equal standard of living; in that way it 
might hope to meet the requirements of equal concern without relying on the taxation and 
redistribution of wealth as an important weapon. But a socialist society whose economy was so 
heavily controlled by collective decisions could not satisfy the further requirement that it respect 
personal responsibility. A community can respect that requirement only if it leaves its citizens 
very largely free to make their own decisions about work, leisure, investment and consumption, 
and only if it leaves fixing prices and wages very largely to market forces.” (Dworkin 2006:106) 
Capitalism’s actual markets are of course far from perfect revealers of opportunity costs: 
they frequently operate under highly imperfect information, under monopolistic conditions, and 
in the presence of a wide variety of positive and negative externalities. But this should not worry 
Dworkin too much. No perfect fit can be expected anyway in a technological, economic and 
cultural context that is constantly changing. Markets need to be regulated to keep monopolies 
under check and to ensure access to relevant information. And market prices need to be 
vigorously corrected in order to better approximate true costs through the internalization of 
externalities. The result will unavoidably be messy, but the use of markets is still the best possible 
way of making people pay and be paid in such a way that they bear responsibility for their 
preferences. 
This justification for the market is nowhere to be found in Rawls. And this is precisely at 
the core of Dworkin’s critique: Rawls fails to take personal responsibility seriously. By virtue of 
what the auction parable is meant to convey, the use of market prices as proxies for opportunity 
costs makes the very notion of equal endowments responsibility-sensitive by making people bear 
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responsibility for the more or less expensive preferences they have and choices they make both as 
consumers and as producers. In particular, those who choose an unproductive way of life should 
pay the price of this choice by being denied an income. In contrast to what he takes to be to 
Rawls’s view, those who opt for “idleness” cannot do so at the expense of the “hard-working 
middle classes” (2000: 330-1). Rawls’s conception of distributive justice, he claims, is unfairly 
soft on those who “prefer to comb beaches” (2006: 104). 
 By contrast, Rawls’s more contingent case for the market on grounds of efficiency is 
totally absent in Dworkin’s approach. This is not because Dworkin does not care about efficiency. 
On the contrary, he considers that Rawls’s maximin criterion, as used in his difference principle, 
countenances some unreasonable costs, i.e. does not take efficiency seriously enough. How 
egalitarian ex post can the distribution that emerges from the insurance scheme be expected to 
be? Suppose first that only income matters to people. Risk aversion in the mild sense entailed by 
the diminishing marginal utility of income will lead to redistribution from situations with high 
earning power (stemming from personal and impersonal endowments) to situations with low 
earning power. If real-world redistribution were costless, hypothetical insurance would lead to 
equal earning power. But administration costs and moral hazard make the real-life redistributive 
bucket leaky. Depending on how leaky it is, expected-utility maximization will fall short, indeed 
far short of equalizing earning power for each under all circumstances, i.e. irrespective of the 
combination of personal and impersonal resources each happens to be endowed with. If we now 
suppose that other things than income matter to people — for example, the pleasure they take in 
their work or other aspects of life irreducible to consumption — and that they do so to different 
extents for different people, deviation from equal earning power can obviously be expected to be 
even more pronounced. Consequently, from the standpoint defined by Dworkin’s hypothetical 
insurance — in contrast to that defined by Rawls’s difference principle —, inequalities in earning 
power that could be durably reduced in order to benefit the worst off can nonetheless be just: 
reducing them would involve an “unreasonable cost”. The best real-life approximation of 
Dworkin’s scheme can therefore safely be expected to endorse redistribution from the better off 
to the worse off on a scale more comparable to what a utilitarian would advocate than to what 
some sustainable maximin criterion would require. 
 In this sense, it could be said that Dworkin cares for efficiency more than Rawls since he 
is willing to diverge further from an equal distribution for the sake of a greater average benefit. 
But this has nothing to do with the reason why the market is essential for Dworkin. The question 
of the market is settled when efficiency considerations are allowed in.  If it turned out that 
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socialism was economically more efficient than capitalism, this would provide a relevant case 
against the market in a Rawlsian framework, but not in a Dworkinian one. For Dworkin, the 
market is needed because it provides a responsibility-sensitive metric of resources, not because it 
is needed to maximize the resources available for egalitarian redistribution.      
 
3. STEINER 
Let us now turn from responsibility-sensitive egalitarianism to so-called left libertarianism, 
as best exemplified by Hillel Steiner’s work. The point of departure is radically different. For 
egalitarians, the fundamental question is how a society’s rules — including the structure of 
property rights — are to be shaped so that they can be justified to all the people expected to 
uphold them regarded as equals. For libertarians, by contrast, the fundamental question is how a 
society’s rules are to be shaped so that they can respect and protect a system of individual human 
rights, including property rights, supposed to be given in advance.  
Any form of libertarianism, so characterized, can therefore be said to propose a historical, 
or backward-looking, or purely procedural, or entitlement conception of justice. But this strong 
sense of “entitlement” must be sharply distinguished from a weaker sense in which Rawls’s and 
Dworkin’s theory also become entitlement theories. On any entitlement conception in this weaker 
sense, a state of affairs can only be assessed as being just or unjust in the light of how it came 
about, more specifically by examining whether the process that led to it respected or violated the 
rules that define a just social structure. Whether a price being paid for a particular good is “just”, 
for example, cannot be determined by just looking at the good, the amount of currency, the buyer 
and the seller. Rather, any price is “just” provided the transactors act within the limits of the 
property rights they hold by virtue of a just social arrangement. The distinction between strong 
entitlement theories and egalitarian theories which are entitlement theories only in the weaker 
sense relates to the question of what makes a social arrangement just, as opposed to what makes a 
particular transaction or situation just. 2 
This difference leads to a justification of the market fundamentally different from the two 
discussed so far. Since private property rights over external objects are among the fundamental 
rights which libertarians believe a just arrangement consist in protecting, markets, indeed 
capitalism, i.e. markets for means of production and the use of labour power, will arise — and 
                                                
2 See van der Veen & Van Parijs (1985) for a clarification and further illustration of the distinction, partly inspired by 
Hillel Steiner’s work and fully consistent with his recent discussion of the notion of a “just price” common to all 
entitlement theories of justice, weak or strong (Steiner 2008).  
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persist — spontaneously out of individual’s wishes to trade what they possess and produce for 
their mutual benefit. Consequently, whereas capitalism is necessarily condoned from a libertarian 
perspective, socialism, or the public ownership of the means of production, is necessarily 
condemned. Libertarians may also tend to believe that capitalism is more efficient than socialism, 
and that this fact has something to do with why it arises and persists spontaneously. But this is not 
what justifies capitalism in their eyes. Even if socialism turned out to be more efficient than 
capitalism, as some libertarians used to believe, capitalism would still be required by justice, 
because capitalism alone is consistent with respect for people’s fundamental rights.3  For 
egalitarians, this is of course nonsense: the structure of property rights is part of the output of 
equality-guided reasoning about just institutions, not part of the parameters within which this 
reasoning must operate. For efficiency-sensitive egalitarians à la Rawls, however, the social 
arrangement which this reasoning will lead to is most likely to ascribe a very significant role to 
the market, precisely because of the efficiency virtues that are irrelevant from a libertarian 
standpoint.  
There is, however, a third type of justification of the market which is common to left 
libertarianism à la Steiner and to responsibility-sensitive egalitarianism à la Dworkin. Whereas 
libertarians agree on the right of each private owner to use his property as he or she wishes, they 
sharply disagree on how one can become the legitimate owner of objects, typically natural 
resources, that previously belonged to no one. Right-wing libertarians adopt the principle “first 
come first served” or,  somewhat more mildly, some “Lockean proviso” that stipulates that no 
one should be made worse off than he or she would have been in a state of the world without any 
private appropriation. Hillel Steiner, by contrast, interprets Locke’s “common ownership of the 
earth” as an equal right to all natural resources, and this is precisely what makes him a left 
libertarian. The best operationalization of this equal right is a right to an equal share in the value 
of the natural resources. But how is this value to be assessed?  
“Market value is thought to be both impartial and relevant because it imposes no canonical 
commensuration, either on the various qualities of a single object or on objects of different 
kinds. Rather, through the interplay of supply and demand, it conflates and subsumes the 
different commensurations of respective market participants and of nonparticipants, 
assuming the latter are not prevented from participating.” (Steiner 1987: 67)  
This way of assessing the value of natural resources was put forward by Herbert Spencer 
and Henry George in the 19th century. Dissociating the value of unimproved land from the value 
                                                
3 See e.g. Wallich (1960). 
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of improvements raises a number of tricky issues which Hillel Steiner recognizes. As stressed by 
David Miller (1999: 191-7), they are made even trickier if one recognizes (as Steiner does, while 
Miller does not) that our culturally diverse world provides the scale appropriate for discussions of 
distributive justice. For the boundaries between what can be and cannot be produced, sold or used 
for profit can vary considerably from one culture to another, and this will unavoidably affect the 
market value of different types of natural resources. Nonetheless, Steiner assumes that “proposals 
like those of Spencer and George — to distribute equally the pure rent of natural resources — are 
based on sufficiently relevant and impartial commensuration mechanisms for implementing the 
Locke solution.” (Steiner 1987: 68). In his left libertarian conception of justice, therefore, “each 
rightholder, when he or she becomes a rightholder, is entitled to an equal portion of natural 
resource value” (ibid., 70). Moreover, it is not just nature that is commonly owned, but also the 
goods left without owner by the death of their owner. Hence, the stock of goods up for this sort of 
assessment and equal distribution can be handsomely expanded: unlike gifts inter vivos, bequests 
can and must be taxed at 100% of their market value (Steiner 1992). 
It is important to stress the big difference between the two roles which left libertarians 
thereby give to the market and the sharply divergent attitudes they correspondingly adopt to 
market prices. In the context of the first role, the just price is left completely undetermined: it 
simply is the amount of some currency which one agent voluntarily pays in order to acquire some 
good or enjoy some service while another agent voluntarily provides that good or service in 
exchange for receiving that amount. The price may have been settled in the light of very 
imperfect information, or on the background of a strongly monopolistic situation, or it may take 
no account of major externalities. Libertarians, left and right, do not care, providing both agents 
are the legitimate owners of whatever they exchange and do not violate anyone else’s property 
rights. By contrast, the market prices to which appeal is being made by left libertarians in order to 
determine what counts as an equal distribution of the value of natural resources — the market’s 
second role — cannot be approached in such relaxed fashion. Quite analogously to what is 
required in Dworkin’s auction, they must reflect the true opportunity cost to others of the relevant 
goods being appropriated by some, and this must be based on a fully informed aggregation of 
supply and demand under appropriate conditions. 
There is more than just a conceptual convergence here. Taken by itself, as we saw, 
Dworkin’s auction seemed to imply an equal distribution of the market value of all donations and 
bequests, just as Steiner’s left libertarian approach to distributive justice implies an equal 
distribution of the market value of all natural resources, possibly supplemented by the value of 
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bequests. The left-libertarian interpretation of the Lockean common ownership of previously 
unowned resources amounts to giving each an equal number of clamshells with entitlements fixed 
by the competitive market prices of those resources. Whether Dworkin’s egalitarian auction, 
taken on its own, or Steiner’s egalitarian appropriation of unowned objects leads to a larger part 
of social or global income being distributed on an equal basis depends on the aggregate 
equilibrium market value of natural resources and gifts, respectively.  
As we saw, however, there is not much point in speculating on this issue, since Dworkin 
has now (sensibly) reformulated his approach in such a way that the distribution of both 
impersonal and personal resources should be handled by his hypothetical insurance scheme. A 
hard, straightforward justification of an unconditional income at a level determined by correct 
market prices is therefore unavailable to (emended) Dworkin, even though, like Rawls, he may 
end up justifying it as part of the just institutional package on the basis of contingent factual 
considerations that relate, in particular, to the importance the “average person” ascribes to leisure 
versus income.4 Left libertarians, instead, provide such a justification, be it at a relatively low 
level that depends on the relative scarcity of natural resources. Unlike right libertarians and unlike 
egalitarians like Rawls and Dworkin, they therefore guarantee to every human being a small 
unconditional protection against having to sell their labour power to the market. 
 
4. REAL LIBERTARIANISM  
The account of distributive justice I proposed in Real Freedom for All (1995) is not 
libertarian, nor therefore “left libertarian” in the sense used so far. Admittedly, the label I 
proposed myself in order to challenge the right’s usurpation of freedom — “real libertarianism” 
— suggested otherwise, and some key aspects of the substance of what I propose can justify 
classification under some more broadly defined “left libertarian” umbrella (see Vallentyne & 
Steiner eds. 2000, Reeve & Williams eds. 2003). Instead, my “real libertarianism” is yet another 
liberal-egalitarian conception of distributive justice. Yet, it seems to converge with Steiner’s left 
libertarianism by giving market prices the same roles as he does and by ending up providing a 
justification for an equal unconditional income as hard and straightforward as his, be it at a 
significantly higher level. How is this possible? Ultimately because it combines the instrumental, 
efficiency-guided attitude to market institutions to be found in Rawls with the recognition of the 
                                                
4 See my discussion of Rawls on this issue in Van Parijs (2002: 218-22). Beyond Dworkin’s reluctant pragmatic 
concessions (1983: 208; 2000: 309), a similar argument can be made on the basis of his most recent formulations in 
terms of an expanded insurance scheme. 
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role the market could play for the sake of responsibility-sensitive evaluation, as exemplified by 
Dworkin and Steiner.    
On the background of the earlier discussion, this point can most conveniently be spelled 
out by returning to Dworkin’s theory. As noted above, Dworkin initially seemed to offer a dual 
conception of distributive justice, with the competitive auction covering impersonal resources, 
and the hypothetical insurance scheme covering personal resources. He subsequently moved the 
auction to the background and subjected both personal and impersonal resources to the insurance 
device. The approach developed in Real Freedom for All could be characterized as doing exactly 
the opposite. It amounts to expanding dramatically the scope of the auction, while relegating a 
functional analogue of the insurance scheme to a shrunk residual role. What motivated this move? 
Fundamentally the conviction that the opportunities we are given in life cannot adequately be 
conceptualized, as they are by Dworkin and in most liberal-egalitarian approaches to distributive 
justice (though not Rawls’s), in terms of our endowments in personal and impersonal resources.  
The underlying intuition is captured in emaciated format by so-called efficiency-wage 
theories of involuntary unemployment, as developed by Joseph Stiglitz, George Akerlof, Samuel 
Bowles and others. Through a number of distinct mechanisms, workers’ productivity can be 
increased as a result of their employers paying them more than what they could get away with. 
The outcome is that the profit-maximizing wage exceeds the market-clearing wage and hence that 
involuntary unemployment will persist at equilibrium — in contrast to so-called “Walrasian” 
models, where productivity is unresponsive to the pay level and where the equilibrium wage is 
therefore, of necessity, the market-clearing wage. Even in the most perfectly competitive 
circumstances — full information, costless entry and exit, no wage legislation or collective 
bargaining, etc. —, it thus appears, people endowed with exactly the same skills can be expected 
to be given very unequal opportunities.  
What is captured in the highly purified air of these theoretical models is only the tiny and 
tidy tip of a massive and messy iceberg. In actual life, the opportunities we enjoy are fashioned in 
complex, largely unpredictable ways by the interaction of our genetic features with countless 
circumstances, from the smiles of our parents to the presence of older siblings, from our 
happening to have a congenial primary school teacher or imaginative business partner to our 
happening to have learned the right language or our getting a tip for the right job at the right time. 
Once we bear this fully in mind, it no longer makes much sense to try to imagine, as we are asked 
in Dworkin’s first-best approach, all possible endowments of personal and impersonal resources 
we might have had and to determine how much we would have insured against having those we 
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regard as unlucky. The alternative is to look directly at jobs and other market niches as 
incorporating very unequal gifts to which we are given very unequal access by a messy 
combination of factors. It is these gifts, and not only the much smaller amount that takes the form 
of donations and bequests that should be made the object of a Dworkin-like auction. This is the 
key distinguishing feature of the approach proposed in Real Freedom for All.  
Needless to say, this assimilation of jobs to gifts is not uncontroversial. Is it not 
undermined, for example, by the fact that one generally needs to do something in order to get a 
job and keep it ? This undeniable fact does not create a fundamental difference with donations or 
bequests. Attending politely your aunt’s boring tea parties may be one of the necessary conditions 
for you not to get forgotten in her will. But this investment of yours does not make you “deserve” 
the whole of the big chunk of wealth possessed by a person to whom you happened to be related. 
Similarly, the fact that one needs to go to the office every morning and busy oneself once there 
does not make one “deserve” the whole of the salary one is able to earn by virtue of a 
combination of circumstances most of which are no less arbitrary than the fact that one of our 
parents happens to have a rich sister. In Dworkinian parlance, our ambition-driven choices and 
efforts, including those involving option luck, all operate on the background of massive brute 
luck. Whatever it was in the auction device that fed the presumption for taxing donations and 
bequests should be resolutely extended to the taxation of jobs, with the proceeds being distributed 
just as equally as Dworkin’s clamshells. Moreover, this should not be misunderstood as an 
equalization of outcomes — a misunderstanding both as tempting and as serious here as it is in 
the case of Rawls’s difference principle — but as an equalization of opportunities. What is being 
equalized is what people are given, not what they achieve with what they are given. 
Is there no risk of overshooting the mark? How can one be sure that only the “gift” 
component of jobs is taxed away? In the efficiency-sensitive egalitarian perspective for which 
Real Freedom for All proposes to settle, this is quite simple: just tax so as to sustainably 
maximimize the tax yield, using nothing but predictable taxation, fully anticipated by all 
economic agents. More explicitly, taking efficiency considerations into account, as an efficiency-
sensitive egalitarianism recommends we do, amounts to endorsing inequalities that are more than 
compensation for productive efforts — typically of greater magnitude that sipping the occasional 
cup of tea with one’s aunt. It endorses higher rewards not only for those who happen to be 
endowed with more valuable talents, but also, for example, for those who happened to take 
advantage of unevenly spread information in an economy in permanent flux, or for those who are 
simply given more than their reservation wage because this is expected to boost their 
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productivity. Trying to fully capture the gift component of jobs would involve an “unreasonable” 
cost in the “Rawlsian” sense of worsening the situation of the worst off. In the gift framework I 
propose, an efficiency-sensitive egalitarianism requires that the gift granted to those with the most 
modest gift should be as high as possible. How are the sizes of the gifts to be assessed?  
This is where I side with Dworkin and Steiner: by using the metric of opportunity costs, 
i.e. in terms of the cost to others of what the gift commands, itself approximated by appropriate 
market prices. If and only if this metric is adopted, we get a strong presumption — in the context 
of a discrimination-free market economy regulated in such a way that prices track opportunity 
costs — in favour of a universal cash income unconditionally granted to all and paid for out of the 
predictable taxation of all market activities. At what level? At the highest sustainable one, my 
efficiency-sensitive egalitarianism recommends. This means that the tax bases — earnings, 
capital income, transactions, consumption, value added, etc. — as well as the tax rates and 
profiles — linear, progressive, regressive or some combination — must be chosen so as to 
sustainably maximize the yield of the tax, under the constraint that it be predictable. Predictability 
is essential in order to prevent the institutional structure (as distinct from extraneous option luck) 
from taking from an economic agent more than the value of the gift incorporated in his or her 
activity, and hence in order to secure that, subject to markets functioning properly, everyone gets 
at least the value of the universal basic income. 
Should an equal amount be given to everyone in one go at a given age or should the 
amount be spread over people’s lives, possibly with a lower level in childhood and a higher level 
in old age? For mildly paternalistic reasons, Real Freedom for All  favours the latter, just as it 
favours giving part of the grant in kind, in particular in the form of free or heavily subsidized 
education and health care (see Van Parijs 1995: ch.2). How much and in what form? A thought 
experiment behind a veil of ignorance must provide guidelines for answering such questions: 
“Supposing we had nothing but the universal basic grant and knew nothing about our life 
expectancy, health state and risks, how would we want it to be spread over our lifetimes and how 
much would we want ear-marked for specific expenditures?” 
To this I added, in Real Freedom for All, a constraint of undominated diversity: justice 
requires that no particular person’s comprehensive (i.e. personal and impersonal) endowment 
should be unanimously found worse than the comprehensive endowment of any other person. 
This concession to the mainstream endowment-based approach I felt was necessary to deal with 
egregious cases of handicaps which generate disadvantages only very partially captured by lesser 
access to jobs and other market opportunities. But I now believe this addition to be inessential. 
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Once it is recognized that distributive justice must be defined in the first instance at the global 
level5, the sort of thought experiment required to apply the criterion of undominated diversity 
becomes even trickier than it is in a domestic context, and even less likely to firmly justify 
significant transfers. To deal with non-pecuniary handicaps, one might as well rely on the nested 
veil-of-ignorance exercise mentioned above as a guide to devoting part of the universal grant to 
health care, bearing in mind that health care must be broadly construed as covering, for example, 
devices that facilitate the mobility of the blind or the disabled. Moreover, while the grant-based 
redistribution can and must be organized on the largest possible scale, this thought experiment 
can best be organized at a decentralized level so as to be sensitive to local circumstances and 
preferences. Thus, veil-of-ignorance exercises still have a role to play, but they are relegated to a 
subordinate function. In sharp contrast with the later Dworkin, an equal, or at least a fair 
distribution of all-purpose clamshells is the basic device. Fundamentally, justice is achieved by 
guaranteeing to every human being as high a minimal claim on the world’s resources as is 
sustainable, in the form of a universal and unconditional grant presumptively given in cash. 
In this light, the core of what Real Freedom for All proposed can be expressed as an 
articulation of four elements. Firstly, there is the ethical view, shared with Dworkin and Steiner, 
that the fair sharing of goods to which no one has a prior claim — such as those found by the 
shipwreck’s survivors on (the early) Dworkin’s island or the natural resources on (the left side of) 
Steiner’s originally unowned earth, or scarce jobs in my non-Walrasian economy — requires 
valuation by suitable markets. Making people pay the true cost of what they appropriate is not 
only efficient but fair. Secondly, there is, shared with Rawls, the interpretation of efficiency-
sensitive egalitarianism in terms of sustainable maximin. Equalization involves an unreasonable 
cost when it makes the worst off worse off. Thirdly, there is a stylized picture of society as a 
massive gift distribution machine, in contrast to Dworkin’s community of unequally endowed 
individuals and Rawls’s system of inter-linked social positions. It is these gifts that must be 
viewed as the substratum of people’s opportunities. It is therefore their value that must be 
equalized across individuals, at any rate to the extent recommended by the efficiency-sensitive 
egalitarian maximin criterion. And fourthly, there is, reminiscent of Normal Daniel’s (1985) or 
Ronald Dworkin’s (2000: ch.8) approach to health care, a thought experiment about the concrete 
shape — lifetime profile, cash versus kind — which the highest sustainable basic grant should 
take. 
                                                
5 See Van Parijs (2007). 
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These four elements combine to provide a theory of distributive justice, not a libertarian 
one like Steiner’s relying on pre-institutionally given entitlements, but one expressing, like 
Dworkin’s or Rawls’s, a responsibility-sensitive, efficiency-sensitive conception of distributive 
justice. The key difference resides in the stylized picture of society which is needed to 
conceptualize inequalities and characterize justice. Dworkin opts for the mainstream perspective, 
shared by most of the economists and many of the philosophers who have been writing about 
distributive justice. The members of society are unequally endowed with talents, capacities, 
earning power, etc. and justice requires that inequalities in these internal endowments should be 
corrected through the distribution of external endowments. It is only in Walrasian general 
equilibrium, however, that internal and external endowments so defined exhaust the factors that 
determine people’s life chances. In our messy real world, many other factors play a role that 
cannot be relegated to the margin as random noise. More than any specific feature, it is the 
inadequacy of this stylized picture that motivated my dissatisfaction with Dworkin’s theory and 
other mainstream approaches.  
Rawls proposed a radically different picture that does not suffer from this defect. People 
can settle in different social positions for all sorts of reasons, and people settled in the same social 
position achieve very different levels of the index of social and economic advantages over their 
lifetimes, also for all sorts of different reasons. However, the notion of social position is tricky. It 
works best in a society with a number of  distinct stable occupations in which people tend to stay 
for most of their lives. To apply it worldwide (contrary to Rawls’s own conception of world-level 
justice) and in a world in which people jump up and down from one position to another is not 
impossible. The Difference Principle simply asks us to focus on the index of social and economic 
advantages that can be expected by those spending their whole lives in the worst social position, 
as defined by the index. However, as soon as part-time work is involved, or interrupted careers, or 
long-term unemployment, we face head on the hard question of how to construct the metric in 
terms of which social positions are to be compared, within regimes and across regimes, in 
particular the question of how to weight the components of the index which tend to be inversely 
correlated, in particular income and leisure. The solution proposed by Rawls himself is biased 
against leisure, and any welfarist resolution is unacceptable to him.6   
The alternative I propose avoids, like Rawls’s, the mainstream reduction of opportunities 
to endowments. At the same time, it side-steps both the need for a nomenclature of social 
positions and the need to provide an unbiased index that would make them comparable. Instead I 
                                                
6 See Van Parijs (1995: ch.4) 
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propose focusing on the gifts we all receive, each measured by its opportunity cost as 
approximated by market prices. Maximizing the value of the smallest gift is a way of maximizing 
the power to consume of those with the smallest such power, but also the power to choose the sort 
of life they want to live by broadening their choice of occupation. It has, it must be admitted, 
limitations of its own, in particular the fact that it leaves out of the grasp of distributive justice all 
those gifts we receive — including no doubt some of the most important to our lives, such as the 
love of those we love — which are not taxable themselves nor mainly a way of accessing 
positions which yield in turn a taxable income. 7 But perhaps this is just as well. Perhaps a 
conception of justice that boosts the market power of those with least market power will serve us 
well enough, and will arguably serve us ever better, compared to the alternatives discussed, as 
mobility grows, globalization deepens and the market widens and tightens its grip. Even so much 
better — who knows? — that Hillel Steiner may discover that his honest, rigorous, patient quest 
for reflective equilibrium has turned him into some sort of liberal-egalitarian. 
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